MET Seminar - Federico Echenique
| Dates: | 26 March 2025 |
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| Times: | 17:00 - 18:00 |
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| What is it: | Seminar |
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| Organiser: | School of Social Sciences |
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| Who is it for: | University staff, Current University students |
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Title: Stable matching as transport
Authors: Federico Echenique, Joseph Root, Fedor Sandomirskiy
Abstract: This paper links matching markets with aligned preferences to optimal transport theory. We show that stability, efficiency, and fairness emerge as solutions to a parametric family of optimal transport problems. The parameter reflects society's preferences for inequality. This link offers insights into structural properties of matchings and trade-offs between objectives; showing how stability can lead to welfare inequalities, even among similar agents. Our model captures supply-demand imbalances in contexts like spatial markets, school choice, and ride-sharing. We also show that large markets with idiosyncratic preferences can be well approximated by aligned preferences, expanding the applicability of our results.
Speaker website: https://eml.berkeley.edu/~fechenique/
Contact: david.delacretaz@manchester.ac.uk
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Boardroom 2.016
Arthur Lewis Building
Manchester
GB
